Beginning with a brief theoretical examination of the role of informality in bureaucracy, the chapter proceeds by suggesting that informality can be considered along two dimensions, namely, discretionary behaviour and involvement in networks respectively. Following this, a description of the Irish politico-administrative system and the background to the liberalization and regulation of the telecommunications sector is presented. As part of this analysis, the actors in the regulatory environment and the formal and informal relationships between them are mapped. Adopting an analysis founded on original and secondary sources, the chapter finds that as well as the formal regulatory arrangement, telecoms regulation in Ireland continues to be strongly informed and characterized by informality and informal relationships.
4.2The role of informality and informal relationships within bureaucracies
It is well documented that within small states public administration organizations and public servants must develop increased capacity to multi-task (Katzenstein 1985; Baker 1992; Randma-Liiv 2002) . This is particularly the case for those states in the AngloSaxon administrative tradition, where the generalist system of recruitment and appointment allows for considerable mobility of bureaucrats between tasks as priorities change, and a demonstrated capacity to successfully undertake different roles is frequently a requirement for career advancement. The size of the bureaucracy and political system in small states also determines that personal contacts are valued professionally, and it is comparatively easy for public servants to communicate directly through informal personal contacts and networks across the administrative system. Alongside the role played by scale in determining the manner in which an administrative system operates is the type of organizational culture which exists within it.
Organizational culture is concerned with the informal norms and values that are important for the activities of organizations (cf. Scott 2001; Christensen et al. 2007 ).
What makes an action appropriate in a certain organization is a normative and institutional foundation that varies across organizations depending on how their respective cultures have evolved, and what its dominant norms and values are. Therefore, while all bureaucratic systems are concerned with legality and formal rule-following, there will be some variation across bureaucratic systems in the degree to which their organisational culture also tolerates the use of informal methods for communicating and ensuring the performance of tasks (cf. Hofstede 2001).
In the Irish case, which is the focus of this chapter, organizational culture within the bureaucracy has traditionally placed an emphasis on the avoidance of conflict and problem solving through the use of informal channels and networks 2 . Such networking also provides a means for overcoming departmentalism and reducing transaction costs, as well as developing trust and shared identity through frequent interaction and exchange. A review of the Irish public service by the OECD in 2008 noted that 'the Irish Public
Service is already rich with informal networks that reflect the small size of the country and of the Public Service' and that 'Ireland is a small country with informal ties between departments and agencies, and between politicians and citizens' (OECD 2008: 44, 229 ).
Thus informality is recognized as a defining characteristic of the Irish administrative system and supported as a modus operandi.
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Given its potential range of application, however, the concept of informality is inherently problematic to theorise or model. Misztal defines it in sociological terms as 'a form of interaction among partners enjoying relative freedom in interpretation of their roles' requirements ' (2000:8) . By contrast Helmke and Levitsky view the concept more narrowly by looking at informality in institutional terms, defining it as 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels ' (2006: 5) . In policy terms, informality could range from the actual setting aside of formal rules in the pursuit of objectives, for example, to the development of standard procedures where none exist. Informality can even be conceptualized as simply corruption or participation in illegal activities, networks or relationships. This latter view, for example, has long been of interest to political scientists concerned with how informal behaviour can undermine formal institutions. For the purposes of this paper, however, we consider informality more narrowly and along two related dimensions: the use of discretion in the implementation of policy, and the engagement of actors in non-formal (but rule-bound) networks and communications.
In relation to the first dimension, the use of discretionary behaviour by bureaucrats when making decisions, and particularly those at 'street level', is a wellrehearsed concern in administrative law (cf. Lipsky 1980; Hawkins 1992) . To its proponents, it is an accepted means of blunting the potentially harsh nature of pure rational law. In this perspective, informality includes the extension of autonomy to bureaucrats to implement a law in accordance with principles established in a political arena for that law, and based on values deemed appropriate to the public interest. By definition, this is a discretion enjoyed by most regulators in performing their standard-5 setting and decision-making roles, and is of particular importance in rapidly changing policy sectors which cannot be regulated by strict legislative interpretation alone.
In relation to the second dimension, the concern is the capacity of actors (or in this case regulatory authorities), to engage in a variety of non-formal networks and personal communications, and to use their informational and resource advantages within such networks in the pursuit of their remit. This is in keeping with Hood's (1983) seminal identification of Nodality (or positioning within a network) as a generic type of instruments utilized by governments to fulfil tasks (the others being Authority, Treasure and Organization). In this perspective, an organization can exercise not alone its formal authority but also any opportunities for discretionary engagement in networks. Such networks can typically emerge organically in response to particular needs and issues, and though informal in nature, each member is bound by their respective organizations' rules.
At first glance, the suggestion of engagement in informal networks or communications may appear unusual in a regulatory setting where transparency is central to market and stakeholder confidence. However the importance of culture, informality and interdependent relations between actors in determining a regulatory regime were key findings of the study by Hall et al (2000) of the British telecommunications regime. In that case, they found that the incumbent operator was able to exert formal and informal influence on the regulator, and recorded the close monitoring by the parent Ministry of the regulator's activities in spite of the formal separation of jurisdictions. They concluded that these factors were as important as instrumental considerations in shaping the regulator's decision-making processes.
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The use of such informal methods in order to engage and persuade others (or more specifically regulatees) is also consistent with the less interventionist enforcement methods identified by Ayres and Braithwaite in their scheme of regulatory enforcement (1992: 35) . In a pyramidal model, they identify negotiated and self-regulatory modes of regulation (at the base of the pyramid) as most desirable form, but recognize that it is only likely to occur in the presence of the threat of imposed external regulation -the apex of the regulatory 'enforcement pyramid'. Thus informal communications and engagements can support effective self-regulating regimes, and reduce the need for the more litigious 'adversarial legalism' which Kagan (2001) describes as permeating the American regulatory and policy process. Non-formal networks can therefore be utilized successfully within legal and constitutional frameworks to support rather than undermine the achievement of formal tasks and objectives. And as will be demonstrated in the casestudy below, as well as remaining subsidiary to formal processes, informal practices and networks can also be formalized once their utility becomes accepted and established. To elaborate on these themes, we turn here to consider the emergence of the Irish telecoms regulatory regime, and in particular to extent to which informality has played a role in its development.
4.3 The Irish administrative system and the liberalisation and regulation of telecommunications As the number of NRAs created by government expanded rapidly during the 1990s, the then Department of Public Enterprise (which had responsibility for electricity, gas, aviation and telecommunications) produced a series of proposals concerned with balancing the governance and accountability requirements of regulatory bodies (Department of Public Enterprise 2000). In part, the review was also prompted by the refusal of the first Director of Telecommunications Regulation to appear before a parliamentary committee, citing the absence of a formal requirement in the legislation establishing her office for her to do so. One of the main proposals recommended by the review was the use of sectoral (rather than industry specific or supra-sectoral) regulators, elsewhere in Europe. As will be identified below, however, since its establishment it has accumulated a growing number of ancillary tasks.
In introducing the legislation founding ComReg, the sponsoring Minister noted in In practice however, the Commissioners did not align with these three sectors.
Instead, as Figure Section 12 of the Act specified the objectives of ComReg in relation to telecommunications, namely, the promotion of competition, contributing to the development of the internal market, and promoting the interests of users. As well as providing and regulating the telecommunications sector, therefore, ComReg must also ensure efficient management of the radio frequency spectrum and provide a universal and affordable postal service 5 . In relation to radio frequency spectrum, as a non-landlocked and militarily neutral country, Ireland has considerable scope for utilizing its radio spectrum for the commercial market.
4.5. assess the various telecommunications markets in Ireland (as specified by the European Commission). Interviews identified that the publication of information on all specified markets annually in order to achieve EU targets had proved to be a very demanding task for ComReg. However, it has the power to designate other markets than those specified by the Commission. Alongside these formal expressions of autonomy, however, interviews reveal that ComReg also utilizes informal means to pursue its goals. For example, it is in regular informal contact (e-mails and telephone calls) with its parent Department, as well as the Department of Finance which has an oversight role in respect of all statutory and publicly funded organizations. The use of such communications is considered to be integral to the 23 regulator's work, and has the added benefit of reducing transaction costs and fostering trust between actors in the regulatory regime. At no stage is ComReg's decision-making autonomy in question, however. Rather, the interviews suggest that these communications help to determine boundaries in the constantly changing regulatory environment.
ComReg's control
As outlined above, while ComReg enjoys considerable autonomy in the performance of its work and internal operations, there are a number of controls to which it is subject and which can limit this freedom of action. Many of these are routine. Interviews suggest that telecoms operators have engaged in strategic behaviour when deciding on whether or not to pursue legal appeals against decisions of ComReg. It was also suggested that the duration of court cases are taken into account. These tend to take between 6 months and a year to resolve, though in some cases they have lasted longer than a year. Strategic behaviour by regulatees is not new in the telecoms sector.
Indeed, when ComReg's predecessor the ODTR was first established, any appeals filed by regulatees to it meant automatic suspension of any related decisions, and it required a change in the law in 2001 to ensure that decisions were no longer suspended on appeal.
It is also the case that ComReg has no power to levy significant administrative fines, powers which most other EU regulators have. ComReg therefore faces a choice of imposing very small fines or else pursuing a matter further through the courts with a view to demanding higher fines, with no guarantee of success.
Formal and informal interactions in the regulatory arrangement
Having considered in some detail the role, autonomy and control of the principal actor in functions and has the authority to impose fines (though this authority has never been tested in the courts) 7 . While TCA is independent of the Department in carrying out its functions, the Minister retains certain powers, including the right to direct TCA to carry out a study. Also, media mergers require the approval of the Minister.
The work of TCA is determined by its 3-year strategy statement and its related annual business plans. These documents are forwarded to the Minister but the Authority retains the autonomy to formulate its own goals and evaluates its own performance.
There are no formal reporting requirements although the Authority appears before and is accountable to parliamentary committees.
When the ODTR was created in 1997, there was no statutory provision for interaction or co-operation between the two organisations. Both had obligations in relation to protecting commercially confidential information and in the absence of a legal framework for such, no information could be exchanged. However, at an informal level, the ODTR and the Competition Authority met regularly to discuss issues of general interest and common concern. The development of this informal relationship was augmented by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two offices.
In the development of new competition legislation in 2002, provision was made for formalising the relationship between the two regulators. Specifically, it obliged the Competition Authority to enter into co-operation agreements with a number of NRAs.
These agreements were to focus on facilitating co-operation and confidential information exchange, as well as to avoid duplication of efforts. The BAI is required to consult with the Minister and its parent Department on a regular basis, and as well as its founding legislation it has a strategic plan approved by the Department and Minister on which its work is based. Goals are therefore set after consultation with the Department, which also evaluates the work of the BAI. It reports on its work each trimester. As with the case of ComReg, under its founding legislation, the Minister 'may issue such policy communications to the Authority as he or she considers appropriate to be followed by the Authority in the performance of its functions' and the Authority must take these into consideration when making its decisions (Broadcasting Act 2009: Section 30) . BAI is funded primarily through funds from regulatees, but also in return for services rendered and through some minor commercial activity. 
ComReg and its Regulatees
To complete the picture of the Irish telecoms regulatory arrangement, it is important to note the various fora through which ComReg communicates with regulatees and EU 
Conclusions
The examination presented here has focused on the work of the main sectoral regulatorComReg -within the Irish telecommunications regulatory arrangement. In pursuing its mandate and engaging with a wide variety of stakeholders, the study identifies the importance of informal as well as formal relationships and practices. From the use of personal contacts at the EU level, to regular informal communications with other NRAs and its parent Department, to establishing non-statutory fora with stakeholders, ComReg has sought to deploy 'softer' forms of influence to supplement its formal requirements and statutory powers. This presents the Irish case in contrast to the other country studies presented here, where there are more complex formal relationships and modes of communication within the regulatory environment.
Returning to the two-dimensional conception of informality adopted at the beginning of the chapter -the use of discretion in the implementation of policy, and the 38 engagement of actors in non-formal (but rule-bound) networks and communications -the In conclusion, the convergence of technologies in the broadcasting, media and telecommunications arenas, as well as the desire to Irish governments to rationalize structures and practices within the bureaucracy as a response to the financial crisis will ensure that the regulatory arrangement for telecoms will continue to evolve. The proposed merger of ComReg and BAI will also alter the shape of the regulatory regime.
EU pressures for greater harmonization in telecommunications policy within the single market (as part of the Digital 2020 initiative), as well on-going exchanges between national regulators through BEREC, will undoubtedly promote standardization in practices. Also, the enduring dominance of incumbent operators and SMP in a number of telecoms markets determines the need for robust national regulatory regimes. The extent to which these pressures will encourage or reduce the use of informal practices and networks of engagement within the Irish case remains to be seen and should provide the basis for fruitful future analysis.
